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The prominence of the issue concerning the limits of Governmental 
liability in tort in the study of Maltese Administrative Law has 
survived the end of the distinction between acts 'iure imperii' and 
acts 'iure gestionis' as a determinant of State liability in our case 
law. 
It may be that the question of 'Governmental Liability in Malta', 
eloquently brought to the fore by the late Professor Wallace Gulia 
through his book by the same title, published more than thirty years 
ago, raises so many intriguing questions about the nature and 
origins of Maltese Administrative Law that we simply cannot help 
keeping the subject on the agenda. The discussion is nevertheless 
not lacking in relevance. After all, the present being the result or, 
some would say the 'funeral', of the past, anyone taking an interest 
in the Administrative law of Malta may at least deem it proper to 
familiarise with the way in which the basis of that law was 
perceived in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century and 
with how it changed and developed to become what it is today. 
The study of what is sometimes termed an 'identity crisis' of 
Maltese Administrative Law also necessarily requires knowledge 
of its historical background. 
The issue is however not just one of nostalgia or of purely 
historical or evolutional interest. It may also have a bearing on the 
applicability of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and on the possibility for the individual to challenge an 
exclusion of State liability stipulated in the law. 
403 
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It is recognised that over the years legislators have found it 
appropriate to include provisions in various laws which grant 
immunity from proceedings to persons performing particular 
functions. 
Such immunities or restrictions on liability are most common in 
matters concerning the exercise of judicial functions, the workings 
of the postal and telecommunications services, transportation and 
in other activities which in some legal systems are categorized as 
falling under a special legal regime regulating 'public utilities'. The 
internal functioning of the armed forces is also an area where such 
immunities from liability are not uncommon. 
It is accepted that these immunities, particularly when they come in 
the form of restrictions on liability or of substitute systems of 
liability,404 are not per se incompatible with the rule of law or with 
the European Convention on Human Rights but their abuse by the 
legislator would be unacceptable to the enforcement bodies of the 
Convention. 
In its judgement in the case of Fayed v United Kingdom405 the 
European Court of Human Rights stated that 'it would not be 
consistent with the rule of law in a democratic society or with the 
basic principle underlying Article 6( I) - namely that civil claims 
must be capable of being submitted to a judge for adjudication - if, 
for example a State could, without restraint or control by the 
Convention enforcement bodies, remove from the jurisdiction of 
the courts a whole range of civil claims or confer immunities from 
civil liability on large groups or categories of persons'. 
A recent judgement of the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the case of Roche v United Kingdom, and the 
dissenting opinions delivered in the same, illustrate the questions 
raised by State immunity and the relevance of knowing its roots. 
404 Vide paragraph c of the final provisions of the Council of Europe's Recommendation No 
R (84) 15 relating to public liability adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the 18 
September 1984. 
40
5 (1994) 18 EHRR 393 para 65 
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In that decision the historical aspect was referred to in particular for 
the purpose of determining whether a situation was such where 
there was no 'civil right' under domestic law, in which case Article 
6(1) of the Convention would not apply, or whether an immunity 
only constituted a procedural bar to an action for the enforcement 
of a right, in which case Article 6 (1) would be applicable and the 
immunity would require justification. 
The 'Roche' Case 
Thomas Michael Roche served in the British army between 1953 
and 1968. In 1981 he was diagnosed as suffering from a number of 
ailments which he suspected to result from tests of mustard and 
nerve gases in which he had participated, against extra payment, at 
the 'Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment' at Parton 
Down in 1962 and 1963. 
Following an unsuccessful application for a service pension in 
1991 Mr. Roche threatened proceedings against the Ministry of 
Defence alleging negligence, assault and breach of statutory duty 
by the Ministry. 
A legal obstacle however stood in his way in the form of a 
provision of the Crown Proceedings Act 194 7. 
Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act provided that, 'No 
proceedings in tort shall lie against the Crown for death or personal 
injury due to anything suffered by a member of the armed forces of 
the Crown' if the Secretary of State issued a certificate accepting 
that 'the suffering' was attributable to service for the purpose of an 
award under a compensation scheme for disablement or death of 
members of the armed forces. 
In practice one could see this section, as granting the Government 
the option to pre-empt an action for damages against it, by 
accepting to grant the serviceman a pension or other compensation. 
Mr. Roche claimed, inter alia, that this option granted to the 
Secretary of State to exclude proceedings in tort against the State 
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by issuing such a certificate violated article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the basis that it denied the 'right 
to a court' guaranteed by that Article. The issue of the 
compatibility of State immunities and of special systems of State 
liability not involving the courts with Article 6 of the ECHR, 
which, guarantees the right to access to a court in the 
'determination of civil rights and obligations', therefore came once 
more under the scrutiny of the European Court of Human 
Rights 4°6.
The first and principal question to be answered on this matter was 
whether the applicant had a 'civil right,' as autonomously 
defined407 for the purposes of the Convention by the case law of 
406 Other cases where the question as to whether domestic law merely imposed a procedural
bar on an action or whether no 'substantive right' existed are Ketterick vs United Kingdom
(1982) 5 EHRR 465, Pinder v United Kingdom (1984) 7 EHRR 464, Fayed v United
Kingdom (1994) 18 EHRR 393, Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 EHRR 245, Z v
United Kingdom (2001) 34 EI-IRR 97, Tinnelly & Sons v United Kingdom (1998) 27 
EHRR 249, and Fogarty v United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 302 
407 "It is recognised, first, that the expression "civil rights" in article 6 of the Convention is 
autonomous: Konig v Federal Republic of Germany (1978) 2 EHRR 170 at 192-193,
paragraph 88. This means that the concept of a "civil right" cannot be interpreted solely by
reference to the domestic law of the member state. It is the view taken of an alleged right for
Convention purposes which matters. But, secondly, the Strasbourg case law is emphatic that
article 6(1) of the Convention applies only to civil rights which can be said on arguable
grounds to be recognised under domestic law; it does not itself guarantee any particular
content for civil rights in any member state: see, for example, Z v United Kingdom (2001)
34 EHRR 97 at 134-135, 137, paragraphs 87, 98. Thus for purposes of article 6 one must
take the domestic law as one finds it, and apply to it the autonomous Convention concept of
civil rights. It is evident, thirdly, that the Strasbourg jurisprudence has distinguished
between provisions of domestic law which altogether preclude the bringing of an effective
claim (as in Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 355 al)d Z v United
Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 97) and provisions of domestic law which impose a procedural
bar on the enforcement of a claim (as in Stubbings v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 213,
Tinnelly & Sons Ltd v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 249 and Fogarty v United
Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 302). The European Court has however recognised the difficulty
of tracing the dividing line between procedural and substantive limitations of a given
entitlement under domestic law, acknowledging that it may be no more than a question of
legislative technique whether the limitation is expressed in terms of the right or its remedy:
see Fayed v United Kingdom (1994) 18 EI-IRR 393 at 430, paragraph 67. An accurate
analysis of a claimant's substantive rights in domestic law is nonetheless the first essential
step towards deciding whether he has, for purposes of the autonomous meaning given to the
expression by the Convention, a "civil right" such as will engage the guarantee in article 6."
-per Lord Bingham in 'Matthews v Ministry of Defence' [2003] UKHL 4
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the European Court of Human Rights , in terms of Article 6 to 
claim damages for tort against the Crown or whether he had no 
such right under domestic law in which case, there being no 'civil 
right' to determine, he would not be able to invoke Article 6. 
The historical development of Governmental liability in the United 
Kingdom assumed cardinal importance in the debate on this 
question. 
Prior to 194 7 in the United Kingdom it was a well-established 
common law rule that the Crown was not liable in tort. 
In his judgement in the case of Matthews vs Ministry of 
Defence
408 Lord Bingham described the situation as follows: 
"Few common law rules were better established or more 
unqualified than that which precluded any claim in tort against the 
Crown, and since there was no tort of which the claimant could 
complain (because the King could do no wrong) relief by petition 
of right was not available409" 
The effects of this rule were nevertheless mellowed in a number of 
ways. One practice allowed that the action be initiated against the 
civil servant who actually caus_ed the injury, with the Crown 
'standing behind its delinquent servant' if the latter had acted in the 
course of his duty and accepting responsibility for the payment of 
any damages awarded by the Court. Where the individual author of 
408 [2003]UKHL 4, 13 February 2003 
409 Quoting Feather v R (1865) 6 B & S 257 at 295-297, 122 ER 1191 at 1205-1206; and 
Robertson: Civil Proceedings by and Against the Crown (1908), pages 350-351.) In the 
nineteenth century several British cases held that the King could do no wrong and that there 
was therefore immunity from actions in tort. Vide Viscount Canterbury v At tomey 
General(l842) t l PH 306; Tobin v R (1864) 16 CB (NS) 310 .. It is also to be noted that the 
question of monarchical immunity (irresponsabilite') was also a feature of French law 
during the pre-revolutionary 'ancien regime' period with the principle 'le Roi ne peut mal 
faire' being used to describe the monarch's legal status. Vide Duncan Fairgrieve 'State 
Liability in Tort' OUP 2003 
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the act could not be identified there was the practice of appointing 
a nominee defendant in order to allow the case to proceed. 
This notwithstanding, it was still felt that the Crown's position was 
unacceptable and a committee, chaired by the Lord Chief Justice 
was appointed in 1921 to propose amendments to the law. The 
Committee produced a draft bill and a short report in February 
192?
4 10 
which proposed to make the Crown liable in tort. However 
the same draft Bill provided for an exclusion of actions of 
members of the armed forces against the Crown 'in respect of any 
matter relating to or arising out of or in connection with the 
discipline or duties of those forces or the regulations relating 
thereto, or the performance or enforcement or purported 
performance or enforcement thereof by any member of those 
forces, or other matters connected with or ancillary to any matters 
aforesaid'411 The Bill was however not enacted. 
In 1946 the House of Lords decision in the case of Adams v 
Naylor412 considered the practice of appointing a nominee 
defendant in cases where no individual civil servant could be 
identified as the author of the damage as unacceptable. The same 
judgement, and another judgement delivered shortly after by the 
Court of Appeal, 413 strongly urged changes in the law. 
The Crown Proceedings Bill, based on the draft bill of 1927 but 
with a number of modifications, was published in 194 7. It provided 
for the liability of the Crown in tort at par with a person of full 
age414 but it still provided for the exclusion of claims against the 
Crown by members of the armed forces in relation to their duties. 
41
° Crown Proceedings Committee: Report (Cmd 2842) 
4
11 Clause 29(l)(g)
412 [1946] AC 543 
41
3 Royster v Cavey [ 194 7] KB 204 
414 An outline of the Act is given in the Roche judgement at paras 76 et seq: 
"The 1947 Act was divided into four parts: Part I "Substantive law" (sections 1-12 of the 
Act); Part II "jurisdiction and procedure"; Part III ''judgments and execution"; and Part IV 
"miscellaneous". 
78. Section 1 provides for the Crown to be sued as of right rather than by a petition of right
sanctioned by Royal fiat.
79. Section 2 of the 1947 Act provides:
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The exclusion was retained in section 10415 of the Crown 
Proceedings Act 194 7 with provision for compensation being made 
through a compensation scheme . 
"2. Liability of the Crown in tort 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Crown shall be subject to all those liabilities in
tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be subject:-
(a) in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents;
(b) in respect of any breach of those duties which a person owes to his servants or agents at 
common law by reason of being their employer;
(c) in respect of any breach of the duties attaching at common law to the ownership,
occupation, possession or control of property;
Provided that no proceedings shall lie against the Crown by virtue of paragraph (a) of this 
subsection in respect of any act or omission of a servant or agent of the Crown unless the act 
or omission would, apart from the provisions of this Act, have given rise to a cause of action 
in tort against that servant or agent or his estate." 
415 Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act, entitled 'Provisions relating to the Armed 
Forces' read as follows: 
"(l) Nothing done or omitted to be done by a member of the armed forces of the Crown 
while on duty as such shall subject either him or the Crown to liability in tort for causing the 
death of another person, or for causing personal injury to another person, in so far as the 
death or personal injury is due to anything suffered by that other person while he is a 
member of the armed forces of the Crown if -
(a) at the time when that thing is suffered by that other person, he is either on duty as a
member of the armed forces of the Crown or is, though not on duty as such, on any land,
premises, ship, aircraft or vehicle for the time being used for the purposes of the armed
forces of the crown, and
(b) the [Secretary of State] certifies that his suffering that thing has been or will be treated as
attributable to service for the purposes of entitlement to an award under the royal Warrant,
Order in Council or Order of His Majesty relating to the disablement or death of members of
the force of which he is a member:
Provided that this subsection shall not exempt a member of the said forces from liability in 
tort in any case in which the court is satisfied that the act or omission was not connected 
with the execution of his duties as a member of those forces. 
(2) No proceedings in tort shall lie against the Crown for death or personal injury due to
anything suffered by a member of the armed forces of the Crown if-
(a) that thing is suffered by him in consequence of the nature or condition of any such land,
premises, ship, aircraft or vehicle as aforesaid, or in consequence of the nature or condition
of any equipment or supplies used for the purposes of those forces; and
(b) [the Secretary of State] certifies as mentioned in the preceding subsection:
nor shall any act or omission of an officer of the Crown subject him to liability in tort for
death or personal injury, in so far as the death or personal injury is due to anything suffered
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Provision was later made for the exclusion of liability in tort to be 
suspended by means of the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) 
Act 1987 but this was not done retrospectively and Mr. Roche 
could not benefit from this change. 
After having examined the decision of the House of Lords in the 
Matthews case
416
, the European Court of Human Rights came to 
the following conclusion in the case of Roche: 
"Drawing on the historical context, the text and purpose of, in 
particular, sections 2 and 10 of the 1947 Act, the House of Lords 
concluded that section 10 did not intend to confer on servicemen 
any substantive right to claim damages against the Crown but 
rather had maintained the existing (and undisputed) absence of 
liability in tort of the Crown to servicemen in the circumstances 
covered by that section. The Lords made it clear that prior to 1947 
no right of action in tort lay against the Crown on the part of 
anyone. The doctrine that "the King could do no wrong" meant 
that the Crown was under no liability in tort at common law. 
Section 2 of the 1947 Act granted a right of action in tort for the 
first time against the Crown but the section was made expressly 
subject to the provisions of section 10 of the Act. Section 10 (which 
fell within the same part of the 1947 Act as section 2 entitled 
"substantive law" - see Lord Hope in the Matthews case at 
paragraph 94 above) provided that no act or omission of a member 
of the armed forces of the Crown while on duty should subject 
either that person or the Crown to liability in tort for causing 
by a member of the armed forces of the Crown being a thing as to which the conditions 
aforesaid are satisfied. 
(3) ...... a Secretary of State, if satisfied that it is the fact:-
(a) that a person was or was not on any particular occasion on duty as a member of the
armed forces of the Crown; or
(b) that at any particular time any land, premises, ship, aircraft, vehicle, equipment or
supplies was or was not, or were or were not, used for the purposes of the said forces;
may issue a certificate certifying that to be the fact; and any such certificate shall, for the 
purpose of this section, be conclusive as to the fact which it certifies." 
416 vide note 408 
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personal injury to another member of the armed forces while on 
duty. Section 10 did not therefore remove a class of claim from the 
domestic courts 'jurisdiction or confer an immunity from liability 
which had been previously recognised: such a class of claim had 
never existed and was not created by the 1947 Act. Section 10 was 
found therefore to be a provision of substantive law which 
delimited the rights of servicemen as regards damages claims 
against the Crown and which provided instead as a matter of 
substantive law a no-fault pension scheme for injuries sustained in 
h if . 417 t e course o service. 
omissis 
124. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to differ from the
unanimous conclusion of the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords as to the effect of section 10 in domestic law. It considers
that the impugned restriction flowed from the applicable principles
governing the substantive right of action in domestic law (Z and
Others, § 100). In such circumstances, the applicant had no (civil)
"right" recognised under domestic law which would attract the
application of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (Powell and Rayner
v. the United Kingdom, cited above,§ 36).
It is not therefore necessary also to examine the parties '
submissions as to the proportionality of that restriction. It is further 
unnecessary to examine the Government's argument that Article 6 
was inapplicable on the basis of the above-cited judgments in 
Pellegrin and R. v. Belgium. 
125. The Court concludes that Article 6 is not applicable and that
there has not therefore been a violation of that provision."
The judgement on Article 6418 provoked dissenting opinions from 
eight of the Grand Chamber's seventeen judges with the following 
remarks by Judge Zupancic being particularly strong: 
417 Para 122 
418 The Court also found that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No 1 (16 
votes to 1), no violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6 and Article 1 of Protocol 
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"It is ironic that we should, precisely in British cases, build on the 
distinction between what is procedural and what is substantive. 
While the Continental legal systems have, for historical reasons, 
traditionally maintained the strictness of the distinction, it is 
precisely the common-law system which has always considered the 
right and the remedy to be interdependent. 
419 Is the remedy 
something "substantive"? Or is it "procedural"? Is the legal 
fiction "the Crown can do no wrong" - and the consequent 
blocking of action (immunity) - merely procedural? Or has the 
substantive right of the plaintiff simply been denied? As we move 
from one British case to another the dilemma appears in cameo. 
It is becoming clear that we need to resort back to common sense. 
Omissis 
A substantive right is its remedy. 
It is ironic that so often common sense and common law should 
come into direct collision. It is doubly ironic that the majority 
should speak of avoiding mere appearances and sticking to 
realities when the distinction the judgment is built upon is pure 
legal fiction. We may have muddled through another case but the 
underlying false premise remains. The dilemma is certain to come 
back." 
The 'dilemma' and the doctrine of 'iure imperii' 
Could the 'dilemma' come back in a Maltese case? 
No 1 (unanimously), no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 6 and Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1 (16 votes to 1), and no violation of Article 10. The Court however 
unanimously found that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
419 
" 1. See more extensively, Zupancic, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 5 European 
Journal of Law Reform 23-125, 2003." 
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The doctrine of 'iure imperii' as defined in the landmark case of 
Busuttil v La Primaudaye
420 has generally been interpreted as 
having effectively recognised Government's immunity from 
actions in tort arising out of acts where the Government is acting in 
its capacity as political sovereign (Jure imperii). It is also 
understood to have done so in a substantive and not in a merely 
procedural sense. Persons such as Busuttil, the silversmith who had 
claimed to have suffered damages because of the allegedly 
careless manner in which the police had taken control of his shop 
in connection with criminal proceedings, are considered not to 
have had a 'civil right' to sue the Government in tort. 
This was subject to the 'palliative' of suing the individual officers 
who were responsible for the damage in their private capacity. The 
reference to the doctrine in the Busuttil v La Primaudaye 
judgement was based on the writings of the Italian authors Bonasi 
and Gabba but at the time when the judgement was delivered the 
doctrine also applied in France. In the famous Arret Blanco of 
the 8 February 1873 the Tribunal des Conflicts had decided that the 
administrative courts had jurisdiction to hear actions brought 
against the State for damages caused by persons which the State 
employs in the public service. Following that decision a number of 
governmental acts, defined as actes d'autorite' whereby the 
administration exercised powers specific to the executive, were 
declared to be non-justiciable while the remaining acts of 
Government, known as actes de gestion could give rise to liability. 
The immunity prevailed until it was abandoned in the Conseil D' 
Etat decision of the 10 February 1905 in the case of Tomaso 
Grecco which involved a claim for damages against the police on 
account of alleged negligent use of a firearm. The claim was denied 
on the basis of lack of proof but the principle of "irresponsabilite"' 
of the police when carrying out actes d' autorite' was not upheld. 
The interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the 
case of Busuttil v La Primaudaye is also still a matter for debate. 
The question is whether the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
that case merely confirmed the First Hall's judgement without 
42
° Civil Court First Hall, 15 February 1894, per Judge Chappelle
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passing any comment, which appears to have been the 
interpretation adopted by Prof. Gulia in the introduction to 
'Governmental Liability in Malta'421, or whether it merely
confirmed the judgement only on the basis of the principles of civil 
law and in particular of the principles of the law of tort regarding 
'culpa in eligendo '. 
In his notes on 'Cases in Administrative Law' Prof. Ian Refalo 
interprets the Busuttil v La Primaudaye judgements as being 'no 
authority at all' that the Government enjoyed some form of 
immunity from liability when acting 'iure imperii' and argues both 
that the Civil Court First Hall's judgement 'never came to the firm 
conclusion that the doctrine is applicable to Malta' and that the 
Court of Appeal upheld the first judgement 'applying solely the 
principles derived from Section 1037 of the Civil Code'. Unlike 
Professor Gulia, Professor Refalo interprets the 'golden' silence of 
the Court of Appeal as implying that 'one must therefore 
understand that the Court of Appeal was not endorsing the 
application of that doctrine'. If this interpretation were to be 
adopted, the 'civil right' to sue the Government in tort must be 
considered to have existed. 
It is, of course now established that the doctrine of State immunity 
for acts 'iure imperii' has been superseded at least since the 
judgement of the Civil Court First Hall in the important case of 
Lowell vs Caruana.422 That judgment however did recognise that 
the doctrine did once form part of Maltese judge made law inter 
alia quoting the cases of Galea v Galizia 423 and Azzopardi v
M lfi • • 4
24 a 1gg1am
421 'All that the Appellate Court found in its power to say in respect of such far-reaching 
judgment is 'Concorrendo nelle conclusioni della Corte di prima istanza che .... (a concise 
recital of the facts) ..... Decide conferrnando l' appellata sentenza' .......... although silence is 
golden, in this case it certainly amounts to acceptance in view of the decision.' 
('Governmental Liability in Malta p 8) 
422 Civil Court First Hall, 14 August 1972 
42
3Court of Appeal , 8 November 1935, Vol XXIX. l.345 
424 Commercial Court 5 January 1902, Vol XVIII.III.69 
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Nowadays governmental liability in tort or quasi-tort insofar as 
these result from ultra vires administrative acts is regulated by 
article 469A (5) 425 of the Code of Organization and Civil 
Procedure and the Government may also be liable to pay 
compensation for breaches of Chapter IV of the Constitution on 
Fundamental Human Rights, of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and for violations of EU law. 
The doctrine of State immunity for acts 'iure imperii' therefore 
appears to be strictly history as far as governmental liability in 
Malta is concerned.. It may still be relevant to keep in mind 
however that the rule that 'The King can do no wrong' also 
appeared to have been laid to rest in the United Kingdom almost 
sixty years ago through the Crown Proceedings Act 194 7, or so 
Mr. Roche might have thought. 
Given that the doctrine of iure imperii was neither introduced nor 
abrogated by legislative intervention and that it was superseded in 
case law prior to the enactment in 1995 of article 469A (5) and 
given the long span of time during which it served as a reference 
point in various judgements of our courts, it may not be 
completely safe to assume that the effects of the doctrine may not 
become a point of debate in some Article 6 case centring on the 
existence or otherwise of a 'civil right' against the Government m 
Maltese law. 
In 1935 the Court of Appeal held in Cassar Desain vs Forbes426 
that English Public Law applied in Malta but that the common law 
of England is not the common law of Malta. That dictum, which 
therefore appears to have excluded the applicability to Malta of the 
425 469A (5)" In any action brought under this article, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff to
include in the demands a request for the payment of damages based on the alleged 
responsibility of the public authority in tort or quasi tort, arising out of the administrative 
act. The said damages shall not be awarded by the court where notwithstanding the 
annulment of the administrative act the public authority has not acted in bad faith or 
unreasonably or where the thing requested by the plaintiff could have lawfully and 
reasonably been refused under any other power." 
426Court of Appeal 7 January 1935, Vol XXIX.1.43 
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common law doctrine that 'The King can do no wrong', may today 
be out of date. However in view of the large number of Maltese 
laws and Constitutional principles and provisions based on British 
counterparts, one can also never be too sure that the old British 
rule of monarchic immunity will not surprisingly spring to 
relevance in some Article 6 litigation as to whether in granting an 
immunity or in imposing a special system of liability the Maltese 
legislator, at the relevant time, was barring access to the courts or 
was merely retaining an immunity which was already in place at 
the time. 
Peter Grech 
August 2006 
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